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Introduction 
OECD unemployment rates show long swings, which dominate shorter business cycle 
movements. Over periods like 1960-2003, unemployment rates in the 21 OECD 
countries we analyse appear to be very persistent series showing stochastic trends. They 
also show both a range of common patterns and a range of national differences. 
According to one view, broad movements in unemployment across the OECD can be 
explained by shifts in labour market institutions, e.g. Nickel et al. (2005), hereafter 
NNO. However, this view has been subject to a challenge, which attributes changes in 
unemployment to shocks in global capital or product markets rather than labour market 
institutions, e.g. Phelps (1994), Oswald (1997), Carruth et al. (1998), Pissarides (2001) 
or Baker et al. (2004). An intermediate position is that shocks drive unemployment, but 
the speed of adjustment of unemployment to the shocks, as well as the magnitude of the 
response, is determined by labour market institutions, e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000), Layard et al. (1991) and chapter 17 of Phelps (1994). Evaluating these 
approaches empirically is problematic because both labour market institutions and 
global shocks are difficult to measure. We will use standard measures of labour market 
institutions and measure the global factor by the common component of OECD 
unemployment. We then investigate the role of domestic labour market institutions in 
transmitting this global factor into national unemployment rates and whether the global1 
factor can act as a proxy for the natural rate in a Phillips curve.  
Rather than trying to devise measures of global influences from the very large 
number of candidate measures, we look at the common component of OECD 
unemployment, measured by their first principal component2. This is not a cyclical 
measure because, like OECD unemployment rates, it is a very persistent series. The 
shocks can be represented by innovations to this series. Based on the empirical 
evidence, we also provide a possible interpretation of this factor. The demand for labour 
(and capital) will depend on the expected return on production, which will have a global 
and a national component. A large number of variables will influence global expected 
returns and the confidence with which these expectations are held. These include global 
competition which affects the elasticity of demand and labour costs; other input costs 
including oil, commodity prices and real interest rates which affect the cost of capital; 
technology which influences total factor productivity; and ‘sunspot’ variables which 
drive ‘animal spirits’. A number of these variables have been suggested as possible 
explanations for persistently high unemployment.  
One could of course try to measure expected returns or their determinants directly, 
but this is likely to be difficult for the same sort of reasons that measuring expected 
returns in finance is difficult (Pastor et al. (2006)). Therefore, it may be easier to 
measure them indirectly by their consequences, the common component in global 
labour (or capital) demand. The interpretation of the common factor in unemployment 
as reflecting expected returns is given added plausibility since the common factor in 
1 In this paper, when we say global we mean our OECD sample. This is a reasonable approximation for 
most of our sample period, but becomes less good towards the end with the growth of China and India. 
2 This approach follows the factor augmented VAR literature e.g. Bernanke et al. (2005), Stock and 
Watson (2005), but unlike them we do not transform the variables to make them stationary before 
extracting the factors, since our interest is in the persistent component. Such cointegrating factor 
augmented error correction models are discussed in Banerjee and Marcellino (2008).  
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unemployment is almost identical to the common factor in OECD shares of investment. 
In Section 2 we discuss the measurement of the global factor. In Section 3 we provide a 
model of the adjustment process by which national unemployment responds to the 
global factor and examine how labour market institutions may influence the parameters 
of that process. In Section 4 we provide estimates of the unemployment adjustment 
model. In Section 5 we provide estimates of a Phillips Curve augmented by global 
factors. Section 6 concludes. 
Global Factors 
We use OECD data for twenty-one countries3 and forty-three years (1960-2002) on the 
unemployment rate uit  in country i  in year t , i =1, 2,..., N t  ; =1, 2,..., T , which we can 
stack in the T N , (43×21) × matrix U . Standard tests do not reject a unit root in all 21 
series. We assume that uit  has a factor structure 
uit = λi ft + eit (1) 
Similarly we have data on the investment rate, Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation 
as a share of GDP, git, stacked as G . We standardise the data and calculate the 
underlying global factors as the principal components (PCs) of the correlation matrices 
of U  and G . These are the orthogonal linear combinations of the data that explain the 
maximal variances of the data4. If the idiosyncratic errors, eit  above are I(0) the PC 
estimators for ft  are consistently estimated (large N) independently of whether all the 
factors are I(0) or whether some or all of the factors are I(1) (Bai and Ng (2004)). We 
will assume that the errors are I(0) and that the long-memory in investment and 
unemployment comes from the persistent global factors. We test for the cointegration of 
unemployment and the global factor below. 
The eigenvalues and proportion of variance explained by the first four PCs are given 
in Table 1. The first PC explains almost 70% of the variation in unemployment and 
almost 60% of the variation in investment; factors common to all countries clearly 
explain the bulk of the variation in both variables5. The first PC of unemployment is 
close to the mean with most countries having roughly equal weights, between 0.18 and 
0.26, the main exception being the US, which has a low weight of 0.08, but a high 
weight in the second PC of unemployment. The eigenvectors (loadings) for the first four 
PCs are given in Appendix A1. 
3 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK and US.  
4 For forecasting, it may be more useful to estimate dynamic factors that take the principal components of 
the spectral density matrix. However, static factors are commonly used in the FAVAR literature. Stock 
and Watson (2005) discuss the relation between dynamic and static factor analysis.  
5 The fact that a global factor is important for investment is also indicated by the Feldstein-Horioka 
literature, where there is substantial cross-section dependence in the residuals of panel regressions of 
investment shares on savings shares, e.g. Coakley et al. (2004).  
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Table 1: Principal Components for Unemployment and Investment 
 Unemployment Investment 
Eigen- % of var. Cum. %  Eigen- % of var. Cum. %  Shocks values explained explained values explained explained 
First PC 14.16 69% 69% 11.85 58% 58%
 Second PC 3.15 15% 84% 2.44 12% 70%
 Third PC 0.98 5% 89% 1.59 8% 78%
 Fourth PC 0.74 4% 93% 1.00 5% 83% 
Notice that we have calculated the factors for unemployment and investment 
independently and not imposed a shared factor structure. However, by plotting the 
unemployment and investment PCs together we can judge whether they share a 
common factor or whether there are only variable specific factors. The first PCs for 
unemployment and investment are shown in Figure 1 below, in addition to average 
OECD unemployment. Note that we draw the negative of the PC for unemployment in 
order to create a more visible fit with the investment PCs.  
Figure 1: The First Principal Components and Average OECD Unemployment 
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The first PCs for investment and unemployment are almost identical, R2 = 0.92 . 
This relationship is not spurious, they cointegrate6 and the (1,-1) restriction on the 
cointegrating vector is accepted at the 5% level, t=1.53. The disequilibrium term feeds 
back significantly on investment but not on unemployment. Since employment can be 
adjusted faster than capital stock this is not surprising. The contemporaneous residual 
correlation is very high, 0.81, so they both seem to be responding to the same shocks, 
which we interpret as innovations to expected returns. As can be seen from the graph 
the fit is less good in the 1960s, which is consistent with growing globalisation over this 
period, particularly after the end of the fixed exchange rate Bretton Woods system.  
The first PC reflects some of the more important macroeconomic events of the past 
forty years: the oil shocks, the recessions of the mid-seventies, early eighties and early 
nineties and the gradual but only partial recovery in the second half of the eighties. This 
component describes the shocks causing the persistent slump that occurred in many 
countries in the seventies, eighties and nineties.7 
As noted above, the expected return to production may depend on a large number of 
factors, many of which are difficult to measure. But in a globalised world the broad 
movements of the expected rate of return are likely to be quite similar across the 
advanced industrial countries, and reflected in their investment and employment 
decisions. Whereas investment and unemployment in any one country will be noisy 
measures of this, the common component across countries may be a better measure. 
While we do not observe expected returns, we do observe a variable related to it. Figure 
2 plots a discount factor calculated from the world real rate of interest: d = 1/(1+r), 
where r is the average (long) real rate of interest for the G7 countries.8 
A clear relationship is present between the two PCs, on the one hand, and the 
discount factor, on the other hand. This suggests that the long swings of employment 
may trace their roots to factors affecting expected returns and the same factors drive 
investment. This pattern is consistent with a variety of theoretical models. For instance, 
Xiao (2004) derives an International Real Business Cycle (IRBC) model with increasing 
returns in the production technology that generate sunspots. These sunspots are 
interpreted as self-fulfilling demand shocks, like animal spirits, and generate positive 
international correlations of output, employment and investment, unlike most IRBC 
models. Similarly Harrison and Weder (2006) find that a sunspot model driven by a 
measure of expectations can explain the entire Great Depression era in the US. 
Increasing returns are not necessary, Hashimzade and Ortigueira (2005) find that a 
neoclassical model with labour market frictions displays expectations driven business 
cycles where the indeterminacy of equilibrium stems from job search externalities. In 
6 The AIC chooses no intercept, no trend in the relationship and with this the trace test for the rejection of 
no cointegrating vectors has a p value of 0.0173, while the less reliable max eigenvalue test has a p value 
of 0.0519.   
7 There is a growing literature that seeks to explore the similarities and linkages between macroeconomic 
cycles across countries. For instance, Kose et al (2003) also find a common world cycle. But again they 
are examining the stationary component, rather than the persistent component that we focus on. 
8 The world real rate of interest is calculated as the weighted average of the real rate of interest in the G7 
countries; the real rates being the difference between the long nominal rates and annual inflation and the 
weights being the Heston-Summers relative GDP for each country. 
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Figure 2: The First PCs and the World Discount Factor 
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the unemployment literature, we have models where equilibrium unemployment 
depends on the real rate of interest. In Pissarides (2001) firms respond to higher real 
interest rates by opening up fewer vacancies, resulting in an elevation of equilibrium 
unemployment. In Phelps (1994) higher interest rates make firms train fewer recruits, 
charge higher markups of price over marginal cost and reduce the production of labour-
intensive capital goods. This causes the natural rate of unemployment to increase.  
Changes in labour supply may provide an alternative explanation. However, the 
composition of the labour force is slow moving, both in terms of the share of the 
working-age population as well as in terms of the educational composition. Francesconi 
et al. (2000) demonstrate that changes in the educational composition of the labour force 
affect both the level and the behaviour over time of the aggregate national 
unemployment series. Interestingly, they find that that the US unemployment series 
have the “European” shape – experience upward mean shifts in the mid 1970s and the 
early 1980s – once changes in the educational composition are accounted for because 
the within-education group series all have that appearance. Hence, taking labour supply 
into account will make the first unemployment PC explain more and render the second 
PC less important. Shimer (1998) finds that changes in the age composition of the US 
labour force explain the rise in unemployment during the fifties and the sixties and the 
decline in the eighties and the nineties. He finds that the entry of the baby boom led to 
an increase in unemployment while the aging of this generation has the effect of 
lowering the aggregate US unemployment rate. However, these changes are too gradual 
to fit the pattern of the first unemployment PC.  
The Adjustment Process 
Firms will determine their profit-maximising levels of employment and investment 
conditional on their expectations of the rate of return on production. Corresponding to 
the profit maximising level of employment will be an optimal or equilibrium rate of 
unemployment, uit 
* . This profit maximising level will be shifted by factors shifting the 
expected returns; the more profitable expected production, the lower optimal 
unemployment. Suppose that we take the interpretation of the first PC of OECD 
www.economics-ejournal.org 
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unemployment, ft , as a measure of global expected returns then the optimal level of 
unemployment is given by  
uit 
* a  bf  t .= +  (2) 
Below we will allow the parameters to vary with countries and time, but we abstract 
from that for the moment. There will be a similar equation for the share of investment.  
Following the approach in Nickell (1985) let us assume that firms have an infinite 
horizon and minimise the present value of future loss 
∞
j ⎡1 * 2 θ 2 ⎤L = E ∑δ ⎢ (u −u i t j  ) + Δui t j  ⎥ (3)it  t  i t j  , + , + , +
j=0 ⎣2 2 ⎦
where δ is the discount factor and θ measures costs of adjustment. The loss stems from 
employment differing from the profit-maximising level and the cost of adjusting 
employment, measured by the parameter θ. The Euler equation takes the form 
δui t, 1+ (1 δ θ −1)uit  + ui  t  , −1 = −uit  * /θ (4)− + +
Solving the Euler equation requires finding the two roots μ1 <1 < μ2  that solve   
δμ 2 − + + −1(1 δ θ μ) +1 = 0 . (5) 
Calling the stable root μ , the optimal policy is then given by 
uit (1 μ)( uˆit −u , 1)Δ = − i t − (6) 
where 
uˆ = −δμ)E ⎡ ∞ ( ) * ⎤it (1 t ⎢∑ δμ j ui t , + j ⎥ , (7) ⎣ j=0 ⎦
the present discounted value of all expected future targets. To make this operational 
requires a model for optimal unemployment, uit 
* , which will be driven by ft . Suppose 
the process is 
Δ = Δ i t − ε (8)uit * ρ u *, 1  + it 
The data for ft , which determines uit
*  do not reject a unit root; the estimate of ρ = 0.58 
and the constant is not significantly different from zero. This can then be used to 
forecast the future targets and, with this specification the unemployment adjustment 
equation becomes 
Δ = Δ +u * d u  * − (9)it c uit ( i t , 1− −ui t , 1) 
where c (1 μ) /(1 − ρδ ) and d == − μ (1 − μ) . 
Substituting for uit
* we get 
www.economics-ejournal.org 
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u  d a  (10)Δ = Δit cb f  t + ( + bf  t−1 −ui t , −1) 
This is a standard error correction equation, in which changes in unemployment are 
driven by shocks, changes in the global factor, ft , and by the adjustment of uit  to its 
steady state value determined by the same variable.9 
The parameters of the expectations process for Δft  seem structurally stable by 
Cusum and CusumSquared tests, but one would not expect the economic parameters 
(the discount rate, δ , and the cost of adjustment, θ ,  which determine μ ) to be constant 
across countries and time. In particular, it is possible that institutions would influence 
both the discount rate and the cost of adjusting employment. Suppose that we have a 
k ×1 vector of variables xit , which measure labour market institutions with the first 
element being unity, then we can make the economic parameters functions of xit : 
Δ = [ '  ]  f + [d ' x ]([  '  + ' ] f −u ) (11)uit c  x  it Δ t it a  x  it ] [  b x  it t−1 i t , −1 
where a b c d, , ,  are now k ×1 parameter vectors10. There are four routes that the 
institutional variables can influence unemployment: (a) through the domestic 
component of the equilibrium level of unemployment; (b) through the long-run effect of 
the global factor on the equilibrium level of unemployment; (c) through the impact of 
shocks to the global factor on the change in unemployment and (d) the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium.  
To allow for higher order adjustment processes we add the lagged change of the 
global factor and the lagged change in unemployment. To allow for national shocks and 
perhaps monetary policy, we add lagged inflation.11 We treat the coefficients of these 
last three variables as independent of institutions to save degrees of freedom. Adding 
the additional variables and an error term gives: 
Δ = [ '  ]Δf + [d ' x ]([  '  + ' ] f −u )uit c x  it t it a x  it ] [  b x  it t−1 i t , −1 + e1Δft−1 . (12)
e u  e  +ε+ Δ + Δp2 i t, −1 3 i t, −1 it  
There are a large number of possible institutional variables that could be included as 
elements of xit . We use five that have appeared regularly in the literature, taken from the 
Labour Market Institutions database of Nickel and Nunziata, extrapolating the final 
values to the rest of our sample. They are generally measured over multi year periods 
and available for 19 of our 21 countries, not Greece and Iceland. These are; the 
coordination of bargaining (coord) with a range {1,3} increasing in the degree of 
coordination on employers as well as unions side; benefit replacement rates (rr); the 
duration of benefits (dur); employment protection (emp) with range {0,2} increasing 
with the strictness of employment protection; and, finally union density (den). 
There is the obvious problem that institutions are likely to be endogenous, 
responding both to global factors and national unemployment. To investigate this we 
9 Higher order autoregressive processes for Δuit *  add further lags of it in the equation. In the case of Δft 
the second lag is just significant. We allow for this in estimation. Pesaran (1991) suggests an alternative 
interpretation of higher order in terms of further adjustment costs.  
10 Strictly the coefficient on Δft  should be [c x' it ][ ' it ]b x  , but we use this simpler formulation. 
11 The first difference of the inflation rate turned out to have a statistically insignificant coefficient 
throughout. 
www.economics-ejournal.org 
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ran a random effects12 panel estimator for each institutional measure on its lagged 
value, the lagged global factor and lagged unemployment. The global factor was just 
significant for emp (t=-2.071) and significant for den (t=-3.008). Thus there may be 
some effect of the global factor on those two variables, but since national 
unemployment is never significant, endogeneity is unlikely to be a problem. 
Empirical Results 
To assess the explanatory power of our global factor, we first estimated a model in 
which the parameters are constant over time but differ for each country: 
c f + d (a + b f  −u ) + Δ + Δe u + Δ +ε . (13)Δ = Δuit i t i i i t−1 i t , −1 e1i ft−1 2i i t , −1 e3i pit−1 it 
The estimates for the individual countries are given in Appendix A2. For large N and T, 
Pesaran (2006) shows that, under relatively weak assumptions, such regressions using 
weighted averages, like ft , as additional regressors give consistent estimates of the 
coefficients and reduce cross-section dependence in the residuals13. 
Using standard critical values Δft is significant in 17 countries; ft−1  is significant in 
14; and Δft−1  in 6. Only in Japan is no measure of the global factor significant. Lagged 
unemployment is significant in 16, the lagged change in 11 and lagged inflation in 6. 
The R2  for changes in unemployment is below 0.5 in Iceland and Japan; and above 0.7 
in 10 countries. Under the null of no long-run relationship the test statistics are non­
standard. Pesaran Shin and Smith (2001) provide a bounds test for a long-run 
relationship, which is appropriate whether the variables are I(0) or I(1). Assuming the 
variables are I(1) we can reject the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between 
unemployment and the global factor in 12 of the 21 countries at the 5% level14. Another 
four are uncertain, lying between the 10% I(0) bound and the 5% I(1) band. The tests 
would not reject no long-run relation in Denmark, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand and 
Sweden. On balance this suggests that the national idiosyncratic factors are I(0) in most 
countries and the stochastic trend in unemployment comes from the global factor. Panel 
cointegration tests would not be informative here, since the null hypothesis of such 
tests, no cointegration in any country, is not very interesting because there is clearly 
cointegration in most countries.    
The equation was estimated by the Swamy RCM method (see Appendix A3), which 
takes precision weighted averages of the individual country coefficients, with non­
parametric standard errors, and by fixed effects, which imposes homogeneity of slopes 
across countries. The results are given in Table 2. 
12 Because some institutions in some countries do not change a fixed effect estimator cannot be used. 
13 There is an issue as to whether it is better to use a priori weights (e.g. the mean) or estimated weights 
(e.g. the PC). Here it does not make much difference since the PC is very close to the mean and they both 
give very similar results. There is also an issue as to how one would endogenise the global factor. Both 
issues are discussed in Pesaran and Smith (2006). 
www.economics-ejournal.org 
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Table 2: Unemployment and the Global Unemployment Factor 
Dependent variable Δuit , N = 21, T =1963 − 2002 
RCM FE 
coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Δft 0.59 8.8 0.62 13.3 
ft−1 0.12 4.0 0.07 7.0 Δft−1 -0.23 -6.0 -0.27 -5.8 
uit−1 -0.18 -5.8 -0.10 -9.0 Δuit−1 0.38 8.0 0.44 9.1 Δpit−1 0.82 2.7 0.69 1.6 
For the fixed effect, R2 = 0.48, SER = 0.65 . The maximised log-likelihood for the fixed 
effect estimator −818  compared to a total MLL of –484 for the heterogeneous estimator 
given in A2. Homogeneity of the parameters is massively rejected, but if we are 
primarily interested in average effects, which is what most of the theory is concerned 
with, this may not matter. The Fixed Effect Estimates are very similar to the Swamy 
estimates, except that the speed of adjustment is lower, which is what one should expect 
from the heterogeneity bias discussed in Pesaran and Smith (1995). The long-run effect 
of the global factor is almost identical, 0.68 versus 0.7. Imposing homogeneity does not 
seem to influence the estimates of the average effect.  
We examined various alternative measures of the global factor. If one uses a two 
way fixed effect estimator, which allows for an unrestricted factor influence by 
introducing 39 completely free time dummies the MLL is -815 as compared to -818 
using the ft  variables in Table 2. This is a tiny improvement for a lot of extra estimated 
parameters. Using mean unemployment instead of the global factor gets the same fit as 
the two way fixed effect as one would expect. Because the first principal components of 
unemployment and investment and mean OECD unemployment are so highly 
correlated, it makes very little difference to the estimates which is used. The first 
principal component of unemployment seems to fit slightly better than the first principal 
component of investment using the fixed effect estimator so this is our preferred 
measure. We also added the second principal component of unemployment to the first 
and this is not significant.  The full results are given in Appendix A4. 
We examined the structural stability of the relationship by estimating the model over 
the period 1963-1982 and 1983-2002. The RCM estimates are given in Table 3. The 
estimates for the two periods are very similar, the biggest difference being that the 
coefficient on lagged unemployment is larger in the first period. The long run effect of 
the global factor is 0.61 in the first period and 0.87 in the second, perhaps reflecting 
increased globalisation. It is probably safer not to put too much weight on this, since a 
trend interacted with the global factor was not significant. It is also noticeable that the 
coefficient of lagged unemployment is lower in both sub-periods than in the whole 
period. This may reflect the downward small T bias that results from reducing T from 
40 to 20. The fixed effect estimates for the two periods showed similar features. With 
14 F statistics are given in Table A2, the critical values assuming restricted intercept and no trend for one 
independent variable are 5% 3.62-4.16 and 10% 3.02-3.51, where the first assumes the variables are I(0) 
and the second I(1). 
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the fixed effect estimates one can test for coefficient equality in the two periods. Since 
the variances were very similar in the two periods, Chow’s first test is appropriate. Each 
fixed effect regression estimates 6 slope parameters and 21 intercepts, so the 
distribution is F(27,786). The test statistic is 2.6 which would certainly reject the null of 
parameter constancy, given the large sample. But while significant the differences are 
not large. 
Table 3: Structural Stability 
Dependent variable Δuit , N = 21,  RCM estimates 
T =1963 −1982 T =1983 − 2002
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Δft 0.50 6.6 0.61 5.1 
ft−1 0.23 2.9 0.20 3.3 Δft−1 -0.18 -1.8 -0.23 2.7 
uit−1 -0.38 -4.0 -0.23 -3.6 Δuit−1 0.32 3.0 0.36 4.9 Δpit−1 0.42 2.6 0.46 1.2 
We now allow the variation in parameters between countries and over time to be 
determined by the institutional variables. To allow for country specific intercepts, we 
used deviations from the means, u%it = uit −ui  and estimated by non-linear least squares 
the full model for the 19 countries for which we had institutional data, dropping Greece 
and Iceland. The fixed effects estimates for the 19-country sample were almost identical 
to those from the 21-country sample with a MLL of –746.9. The full model has 26 slope 
parameters: 
Δ =u [ ' Δf + [d ' x ]([a x  ] [ b x  ' ] f −u ) + e Δ + Δu + Δp +ε ´(14)%it c x  it ] t it ' it + it t−1 %i t , −1 1 ft−1 e2 %i t , −1 e3 i t , −1 it 
This had a MLL of –714.3 and the results are given in Appendix A5. Dropping the least 
significant coefficient (except constants) and re-estimating sequentially led to the 
specification shown in Table 4, where the t ratios are calculated using robust standard 
errors. 
The R2  in levels is 0.96, close to that obtained by NNO of 0.98, with country 
specific trends and time effects and many more variables. The fit for the individual 
countries was generally good, with the R2  for the level of unemployment over 0.95 in 
13 of the 19 countries. It was below 0.9 only for the US, 0.3, and Portugal 0.88. The US 
appears to be different, this R2  is a lot lower than obtained with the country specific 
equation shown in A2: allowing for institutions but otherwise imposing common 
parameters leads to a severe deterioration in the explanation for the US. Over all 
countries, the institutional variables have no effect on the domestic component of 
equilibrium unemployment. Increased coordination reduces the speed of adjustment 
from 0.19, when coordination takes its lowest value 1, to 0.07 when it takes its highest 
value 3. NNO get a speed of adjustment of 0.15. Increased employment protection 
reduces the short run effect of changes in the global factor on changes in unemployment 
www.economics-ejournal.org 
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Table 4: Institutions and Unemployment Adjustment, 
Allowing for Country Specific Means 
Dependent variable Δuit , N =19, T =1963 − 2002 
coefficient t-ratio 
a0 -0.92 3.3 
t 1f − 0.25 2.4 
1 * temp f − 0.35 4.3 
1 * tdur f − 0.26 2.2 
tΔf 0.65 5.4 
emp *Δf -0.24 2.9 
* trr Δf 0.58 3.1 
u%it−1 0.25 4.8 
1 * itcoord u% − -0.06 2.6 
t 1f −Δ -0.29 5.9 
uit−1Δ % 0.41 7.6 
pit−1Δ  2.20 3.3 
R2 = 0.52, SER = 0.63, MLL = −727 . 
but increases the long run effect of the global factor on equilibrium unemployment. A 
higher replacement ratio increases the short run effect of changes in the global factor. A 
higher duration of benefits increases the long-run effect on equilibrium unemployment. 
Higher lagged inflation raises equilibrium unemployment.  
Specification searches can be sensitive to the order restrictions are imposed, so the 
levels of the institutional variables were added to the final model and were not 
significant individually or jointly. The product of dur and rr, the change in den and the 
product of coord and den used by NN0, were also not significant. The current and 
lagged change and lagged level of either the second unemployment PC or the first 
investment PC were also not significant. 
Institutions seem to influence adjustment to the global factor but have no influence 
on the natural rate, which is determined just by the global factor. But even after 
allowing for institutions there is substantial heterogeneity between countries. The 
institutional model in Table 4, has 28 parameters and an MLL of -727. The 
heterogeneous model of Table A2 has, for the 19 countries, 133 parameters and an MLL 
of -441. These models are not nested. The institutional model allows time-variation in 
the parameters but restricts between-country variation to that associated with 
institutional variables; the heterogeneous model allows parameters to differ freely over 
countries, which can pick up the effect of country specific institutions, but does not 
allow variation over time. They can however be compared using model selection 
criteria. The AIC would select the heterogeneous model; the BIC, which penalises over-
parameterization more heavily, would select the institutional model. Given possible 
concerns about the quality of the institutional data it seems preferable to use the 
heterogeneous model which we do below. 
www.economics-ejournal.org 
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5 The Phillips Curve 
Section 4 showed that the global factor shifts the equilibrium level to which 
unemployment adjusts, thus it can be interpreted as a determinant of the natural rate. 
This prompts the question, how does it perform as a measure of the natural rate in a 
Phillips Curve? We return to the sample of 21 countries, since we are not using the 
institutional variables. (We investigated including the institutional variables in the 
Phillips Curve in the 19 country sample, but they were not significant, see Appendix 
A6) We assume that the natural rate is a function of the global factor as in (2) above 
u * a  b f  .= +it i i t 
We also allow global inflation, measured by average inflation in the sample Δpt  to shift 
national inflation, perhaps because of global cost shocks or common monetary policy 
responses to shocks. There is a lot of evidence for global influences on the Phillips 
curve, see Dees et al. (2008). 
Consider a model in which the change in inflation, Δ2 pit , is determined by the 
deviation of unemployment from its natural rate, u − (a + b f  ), the change in averageit i i t 
inflation, Δ2 pt , and the deviation of lagged inflation from a function of the global 
average (Δ − Δpit−1 θi pt−1) : 
2 2p = −β (u (a  b f  ))  γ p λ (Δ − + + Δ − Δ − Δp θ p ) +ε (15)it i it i i t i t i it−1 i t−1 it 
We can parameterize (15) to test the hypothesis θi =1 by writing it as 
Δ2 p = −β (u (a  b f  ))  γ 2 p λθ ( p Δp ) + λ ( − Δ +  (16)− + + Δ − Δ − θ 1)  p εit i it i i t i t i i it−1 t−1 i i it−1 it 
If θi =1, lagged inflation drops out of the equation. 
Equation (16) was estimated separately for each country and the results are given in 
Appendix A7. The RCM and fixed effect estimates are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: The Phillips Curve. 
Dependent variable 2 pitΔ , 21, N = 1963 2002T = −
RCM FE 
uit 
tf 
2 
tpΔ
1 1it tp p− −Δ −Δ
pit−1Δ
Constant 
Coefficient 
-0.464 
0.222 
0.86 
-0.636 
0.008 
2.00 
t-ratio 
-2.47 
2.40 
3.22 
-4.87 
0.077 
4.15 
coefficient 
-0.194 
0.124 
0.999 
-0.584 
0.005 
--- 
t-ratio 
-2.82 
2.09 
9.82 
-12.05 
0.13 
--- 
Although homogeneity is strongly rejected, both, the RCM and fixed effect estimates 
have the right sign for every variable. Unemployment has a negative effect and the 
natural rate a positive effect. The change in world inflation has a coefficient close to 
one. There is rapid adjustment of inflation to average inflation, over half the deviation 
made up in a year. This is consistent with the literature on inflation convergence, e.g. 
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Hyvonen (2004). Lagged inflation is insignificant, which is required for consistency: 
averaging the equations over country must give average inflation. While we do not 
reject θi =1, on average, it is rejected in a number of countries. The RCM Phillips curve 
estimate of the average natural rate as a function of the global factor (which has mean 
zero over the sample) in percent is ut 
* = 4.3 + 0.48 ft . The RCM unemployment 
adjustment estimate of the average natural rate from Table 2 is ut 
* = 4.7 + 0.68 ft  which 
is similar. These are close and if one used the FE estimate of the effect of the global 
factor in the Phillips curve, b = 0.64, this would be very close to the FE estimate from 
the unemployment adjustment equation b = 0.7 . Thus the estimates of the influence of 
the global factor on the natural rate in the two equations are broadly consistent. Using 
lagged values, uit−1  and ft−1  instead of current values gives similar results.  
Looking at the individual countries, unemployment has a negative sign in all but 
Denmark and Portugal. The global factor has a positive sign in all but Denmark, Finland 
and Japan. The lagged deviation of inflation from the average always has a negative 
sign. Lagged inflation has mixed positive and negative signs and is significant in 12 
countries, rejecting θi =1. The minimum R squared is 0.38 in Austria, the maximum 
0.79 in Canada. Fifteen countries have an R squared over 0.5.  
The hypothesis that the natural rate of unemployment is determined by the global 
factor implies cross-equation restrictions on the unemployment adjustment and Phillips 
curve equations, since the natural rate, u * = + b f  , appears in both. The two equation ait i i t 
system was estimated for each country and the cross-equation restriction tested. The 
system is given by equations (13) and (16), which simplifying the notation is 
Δ = d (a + b f  −u ) c f e f e u e p ε 1 (17)u + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ +it  i i i t−1 i t  , −1 i t 1i t−1 2i  i t  , −1 3i  it  −1 it  
2 2 2p = −β (u (a  b f  ))  γ p δ ( p Δp ) + Δ +p ε (18)Δ − + + Δ − Δ − ηit i it i i t i t i it−1 t−1 i it−1 it 
Notice that the system is recursive, current unemployment influences inflation, but 
current inflation does not influence unemployment. The cross-equation restriction is that 
the i , ia b  in the two equations are the same. The interpretation that the intercept in (18) 
measures β a  requires that domestic inflation is proportional to average inflation, i iθi =1, as assumed above. Otherwise, if the last term in (15) were 
( pit−1 p 
* 
i θi pt−1) , there will be a term in domestic equilibrium inflation included Δ −Δ − Δ
in the intercept. This may lead to the cross-equation restriction being rejected.  
The two equations were estimated as a system for all 21 countries allowing for the 
covariance between (ε 1 it ,ε 2 it ) . The cross-equation restrictions were rejected only for 
France, Italy and Portugal15. However, in Austria, Denmark and Finland the 
constrained system produced estimates of di and βi very close to zero, so that ai  and 
bi  were not identified. Thus the cross-equation restrictions implied by the model can be 
accepted in 15 out of the 21 countries: the globally determined natural rate in the 
Phillips Curve is the same natural rate to which unemployment is adjusting. In the 
countries with identified estimates, ai  ranged from 2.48 in Iceland to 8.77 in Spain, bi
ranged from -0.31 for Japan (the only negative estimate), 0.18 in the US to 1.49 in 
Spain. The estimates are given in Appendix A8. 
15 The Likelihood ratio test statistics were 10.93, 9.52 and 10.45 respectively, with a 5% critical value of 
5.99. 
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The inflation equation, (18), can be interpreted as an expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve by writing it; 
Δ = − + γ p 2p φ E (Δ −p ) β (u (a  b f  ))  + Δ +ε (19)it i t−1 it i it i i t i t it 
Et−1(Δ =pit  ) π i ' xit  −1 (20) 
where xit−1  is a set of variables observed at time t-1. This allows us to test both φi =1 
and the cross-equation restrictions implied by rational expectations: xit−1  only enters the 
Phillips curve through inflation expectations: 
p φ E ( 'π x ) − β (u (a  b f  ))  + Δ +ε 2 .Δ = − + γ p (21)it i t−1 i it i it i i t i t it 
The three equation system, (17), (19), (20) was estimated separately on the 21 countries 
imposing the natural rate restriction with various specifications of xit−1 . As one would 
expect, results were sensitive to the choice of xit−1 . We will comment on those just 
using lagged inflation and lagged average inflation, which is consistent with the model 
of A3. The φi =1 and the rational expectations restrictions were rejected by relatively 
few countries. For instance, φi =1 was rejected only in Belgium, France, Ireland and the 
UK. However, the standard errors of both φi  and π i  were large in some cases so the 
tests may not have high power. Although the estimates are not inconsistent with a 
vertical Phillips Curve, while βi  was usually the right sign in the restricted system, it 
was rarely significant. For the same xit−1  it was positive in only Austria, Germany and 
Portugal, but significantly negative in only Belgium, UK and US. The reason for this 
seems to be that the term ( u (a  b f  ))  is very persistent and thus predictable and its − +it i i t 
predictable component is captured by Et−1(Δpit  )  leaving the realization of the deviation 
of unemployment from its natural rate insignificant. In fact rejection of φi =1 seemed to 
be more common when βi  was significant. When the system was estimated imposing 
all four restrictions, the two implied by a common natural rate, φi =1 and the restriction 
implied by rational expectations, the joint restrictions were rejected in 11 of the 21 
countries.16 Therefore it seems more useful to work with the estimates in Appendix A7, 
where rational expectations are not imposed and the deviation of unemployment from 
its natural rate is significant in many countries. 
A simple Phillips curve, assuming a common form of equation in each country, 
works quite well, once one takes account of global factors, both in determining the 
natural rate and in influencing national inflation. When the Phillips curve was estimated 
together with the unemployment adjustment equation as a system, the hypothesis that 
the same natural rate, u * = + b f  , appeared in both equations could not be rejected in ait i i t 
15 out of the 21 countries. The data are also consistent for many countries with a 
vertical Phillips Curve and rational expectations, though when these restrictions are 
imposed, the deviation of unemployment from its natural rate tends to become 
insignificant. 
16 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,  Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden. 
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Conclusions 
There is a large common component in OECD unemployment, which accounts for 
about 70% of the total variance. This common component is a very persistent series; is 
almost identical to the common component in investment shares and explains a 
substantial amount of national unemployment variation. It has a natural interpretation in 
terms of the global expected return on production and is consistent with a variety of 
sunspot or animal spirit models. We propose a simple model of unemployment 
adjustment and allow five measures of labour market institutions to influence 
unemployment; (a) through the equilibrium level of unemployment; (b) through the 
long-run effect of the global factor on the equilibrium level of unemployment; (c) 
through the impact of shocks to the global factor on the change in unemployment and 
(d) the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. We find that the institutional variables have 
no effect on the equilibrium level of unemployment; that increased coordination reduces 
the speed of adjustment; that increased employment protection reduces the short run 
effect of changes in the global factor but increases the long run effect; and that a higher 
replacement ratio increases the short run effect of changes in the global factor. However 
a model without institutions but which allowed for more cross-country heterogeneity 
was selected by the AIC, though not the BIC. 
Conditional on our measure of global factors, it appears that labour market 
institutions influence the transmission of global influences rather than determining the 
equilibrium level of unemployment which is determined by the global factor. Given this 
we examined a Phillips Curve in which the natural rate is determined by the global 
factor and where equilibrium inflation adjusts to the global average inflation rate. This 
worked well and on average we found a vertical Phillips Curve once one allowed for 
global influences on the natural rate. When the Phillips curve and unemployment 
adjustment equations were estimated as a system, the hypothesis that the same natural 
rate appeared in both could not be rejected in 15 out of the 21 countries. Idiosyncratic 
factors are important. Although the equations have a common form, the parameters 
differ significantly across countries. In explaining both unemployment and inflation, 
global factors are very significant suggesting that models which ignore them are likely 
to be deficient. 
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Appendix A1: Eigenvectors for Unemployment and Investment 
First PC Second PC Third PC Fourth PC 
U G U G U G U G 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
New Zeal. 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
US 
0.252 
0.235 
 0.246 
0.228 
0.234 
0.219 
0.258 
0.247 
0.193 
0.191 
0.183 
0.244 
0.180 
0.211 
0.218 
0.239 
0.154 
0.256 
0.199 
0.234 
0.085 
0.220 
0.253 
0.231 
0.251 
0.260 
0.228 
0.276 
0.186 
0.221 
0.248 
0.123 
0.241 
0.233 
0.231 
0.172 
0.212 
0.010 
0.175 
0.257 
0.226 
0.166 
0.100 
-0.209 
0.123 
0.210 
0.185 
-0.194 
-0.022 
-0.130 
-0.285 
-0.231 
0.311 
-0.130 
-0.226 
0.295 
-0.1376 
-0.0996 
0.2901 
0.0256 
-0.2545 
0.2212 
0.4292 
-0.035 
0.002 
-0.074 
0.126 
-0.169 
0.116 
-0.016 
-0.350 
0.273 
0.072 
0.486 
-0.008 
-0.156 
-0.311 
0.162 
0.098 
0.464 
-0.046 
-0.191 
0.035 
0.290 
0.040 
-0.019 
-0.253 
0.135 
0.133 
0.097 
-0.104 
-0.183 
-0.103 
0.382 
0.216 
-0.153 
-0.482 
-0.047 
0.410 
0.210 
-0.345 
-0.107 
0.130 
-0.045 
0.147 
0.196 
-0.113 
-0.384 
0.135 
0.089 
0.114 
-0.101 
-0.050 
-0.144 
-0.057 
-0.239 
0.125 
-0.111 
-0.091 
0.370 
0.323 
-0.090 
-0.417 
0.040 
-0.013 
0.343 
-0.019 
0.205 
-0.020 
-0.002 
-0.034 
-0.425 
0.026 
0.052 
0.367 
-0.342 
0.220 
0.122 
0.007 
0.082 
0.135 
0.215 
-0.474 
0.057 
-0.400 
0.026 
-0.003 
-0.044 
-0.208 
0.093 
0.144 
-0.028 
0.177 
-0.054 
-0.411 
-0.138 
0.130 
-0.074 
-0.172 
-0.233 
-0.123 
0.206 
0.194 
-0.270 
0.496 
0.113 
0.255 
-0.308 
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Appendix A2: Unemployment Equations by Country: Coefficients. 
Dependent variable change in unemployment 
Coefficients and t ratios, bold if t>2 
tΔf t 1f − t 1Δf − ut−1 ut−1Δ t 1π − ai 
1 Australia 0.94 0.43 -0.26 -0.59 0.27 7.23 2.83 
(7.00) (4.13) (1.54) (4.31) (1.89) (2.93) (3.93) 
2 Austria 0.26 0.08 -0.12 -0.14 0.11 1.96 0.38 
(4.38) (3.19) (1.50) (2.10) (0.61) (0.64) (1.30) 
3 Belgium 0.57 0.15 -0.17 -0.17 0.44 7.69 0.70 
(5.14) (2.79) (1.13) (3.04) (3.31) (2.20) (2.25) 
4 Canada 0.99 0.17 -0.19 -0.33 0.09 4.88 2.18 
(6.52) (2.80) (0.92) (3.15) (0.60) (1.69) (2.78) 
5 Denmark 0.95 0.15 -0.50 -0.23 0.27 6.89 0.60 
(6.52) (1.57) (2.93) (1.82) (1.86) (1.67) (1.27) 
6 Finland 1.10 0.14 -0.52 -0.17 0.66 -5.18 1.30 
(4.85) (2.26) (1.79) (3.02) (5.00) (1.06) (2.56) 
7 France 0.52 0.44 -0.26 -0.43 0.17 3.23 2.82 
(5.29) (4.53) (1.91) (4.58) (1.26) (1.59) (4.44) 
8 Germany 0.65 0.05 -0.26 -0.03 0.35 4.69 0.04 
(5.63) (0.79) (1.48) (0.33) (1.80) (0.82) (0.10) 
9 Greece 0.60 0.16 -0.34 -0.17 0.55 -3.47 1.37 
(4.30) (3.25) (2.36)    (2.90) (3.74) (1.84) (2.69) 
10 Iceland 0.21 0.06 0.22 -0.32 0.20 -1.28 0.83 
(1.70) (2.18) (1.69) (3.09) (1.31) (2.41) (3.12) 
11 Ireland 1.15 -0.04 0.06 0.00 -0.20 6.91 -0.69 
(3.52) (0.48) (0.16) (0.01) (1.10) (1.43) (0.86) 
12 Italy 0.15 0.29 -0.10 -0.38 0.29 -1.63 2.91 
(1.21) (4.26) (0.70) (4.26) (2.17) (1.03) (4.16) 
13 Japan 0.08 0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.35 2.38 -0.13 
(1.44) (1.67) (0.97) (0.65) (1.76) (1.90) (0.79) 
14 Netherlands 0.73 0.07 -0.21 -0.13 0.57 2.34 0.40 
(5.68) (1.71) (1.20) (2.62) (4.13) (0.51) (1.35) 
15 New Zealand 0.54 0.10 -0.59 -0.12 0.45 4.37 0.16 
(2.43) (0.90) (3.49) (0.84) (2.86) (1.16) (0.24) 
16 Norway 0.47 0.10 -0.35 -0.29 0.63 -1.60 0.89 
(4.45) (2.72) (3.57) (2.57) (4.57) (0.47) (1.94) 
17 Portugal 0.18 0.08 0.20 -0.31 0.56 3.95 1.27 
(1.01) (2.30) (1.14) (4.36) (4.72) (2.07) (3.91) 
18 Spain 0.64 0.49 -0.17 -0.32 0.58 1.60 2.71 
(4.37) (4.07) (0.87) (4.24) (5.61) (0.69) (3.86) 
19 Sweden 0.79 0.07 -0.22 -0.16 0.44 -7.31 0.88 
(5.21) (2.09) (1.25) (2.15) (2.76) (1.85) (2.20) 
20 UK 0.70 0.15 -0.39 -0.18 0.47 6.81 0.58 
(3.89) (2.27) (2.06) (2.56) (3.07) (2.70) (1.37) 
21 US 0.70 0.04 -0.37 -0.32 0.03 16.05 1.15 
(4.37) (1.60) (2.21) (3.79) (0.23) (4.20) (2.38) 
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Appendix A2 continued: Unemployment Equations by Country Diagnostic Statistics 
SER LL R2 FLR 
1 Australia 0.50 -25.28 0.75 9.96 
2 Austria 0.22 7.87 0.61 6.86 
3 Belgium 0.41 -16.79 0.78 4.93 
4 Canada 0.57 -30.45 0.70 5.26 
5 Denmark 0.52 -26.67 0.69 1.92 
6 Finland 0.84 -45.98 0.73 4.83 
7 France 0.34 -9.61 0.74 11.11 
8 Germany 0.39 -15.65 0.70 1.47 
9 Greece 0.44 -20.27 0.65 5.63 
10 Iceland 0.47 -22.59 0.44 5.06 
11 Ireland 1.19 -59.79 0.52 0.30 
12 Italy 0.37 -13.05 0.66 9.78 
13 Japan 0.18 14.59 0.38 3.16 
14 Netherlands 0.49 -24.09 0.77 3.71 
15 New Zealand 0.63 -34.33 0.52 0.43 
16 Norway 0.36 -12.00 0.59 4.00 
17 Portugal 0.62 -33.56 0.66 10.27 
18 Spain 0.56 -29.76 0.83 9.60 
19 Sweden 0.52 -26.49 0.65 2.73 
20 UK 0.61 -32.83 0.73 3.48 
21 US 0.52 -27.13 0.73 7.64 
SER is standard error of regression, LL maximised Log likelihood, FLR is the F statistic for 
excluding lagged unemployment and lagged global factor.  
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Appendix A3: Swamy RCM Procedure 
Write the heterogeneous model as 
yi =Wiδ i + ui 
where yi  is a T×1 vector, and Wi   is a T×(k+1) vector. The fixed effect estimator 
constrains the k slopes to be the same.  The parameters are assumed to be random, 
i = + i where ( i ) E(ηi jη ) = , i j E ηi jη ) = 0,  ηi areδ δ η E η = 0, Ω = , ( otherwise, and the 
independent of Wi . There are a large number of estimators for the expected value of the 
random coefficients. The simplest one consists of computing the OLS estimates for each 
country δˆ  i  and then constructing the average δ =∑ i δˆ  i / N , estimating the (k+1)×(k+1) 
covariance matrix Ω by 
ˆ ˆ ˆΩ =∑ ( i − )(  i − ) ' −1)  δ δ δ δ /(  Ni 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) call this the Mean Group estimator. Its covariance matrix is 
( )  ˆ / NV δ = Ω
Swamy (1970) suggests a feasible GLS estimator, which is equivalent to using a 
weighted average of the individual OLS estimates instead of the unweighted average. 
Define the residuals, the unbiased estimate of the variance and the estimated variance 
covariance matrix as follows 
ˆi yi ˆ i ; s 
2 = i T k 1), V ( )δˆ i = i 2 ( ' i )−1.u = −Wiδ i u u  ˆ ˆi '/( − − s  W W  i 
Swamy suggests estimating Ω by 
% V ( ) /Ω = Ωˆ −∑ i δˆ  i N 
If this estimator is not positive definite (which it rarely is), the last term is set to zero 
and Ωˆ  used. The Swamy estimator of the mean is 
δ = D δ , D = ∑ ⎡Ω% V ( )⎤ Ω V δ ⎤ , V ( )δ = ∑ ⎡ % V ( )⎤+ δ ⎡ + ( )  Ω δ% ∑ i i i  ˆ i { i ⎣ ˆ i ⎦−1}−1 ⎣ % ˆ i ⎦−1 ˆ i { i ⎣ + ˆ i ⎦−1}−1 
Notice that the Swamy estimator of the standard errors is non-parametric it depends on 
the distribution of the δˆ  i  and therefore is likely to be robust to serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
The Swamy RCM can be interpreted either as a GLS estimator or an empirical Bayes 
estimator. The homogeneity hypothesis Ho :δ i = δ  can be tested by the Wald test 
suggested by Swamy 
2S =∑ i (δ δˆ i − *) 'V (δ δ δˆ i )( ˆ i − *) ~ χ (k +1)( N −1) 
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* = ⎣∑ i ˆ i −1 ⎦−1 ˆ i −1 ˆ iwhere δ ⎡ V ( )  ⎤ V δ δ is a feasible GLS fixed effect estimator. Theδ ( )  
desirable properties of this test depend on T being large relative to N, which is the case 
in our application. 
Appendix A4: Alternative Measures of the Global Factor 
The correlation of the first PC of unemployment with mean unemployment is 0.998 and 
with the first PC of investment factor -0.961. The correlation between the investment 
PC and mean unemployment is -0.952. The second PC of unemployment is uncorrelated 
with the first and has correlations of -0.07 with both the first PC of investment and 
mean unemployment.  
Below in sequence are given (a) the two way fixed effect estimates which allow for 
an implicit unobserved factor by adding 39 free time dummies, then the Swamy RCM 
and Fixed Effects estimates using as factors (b) the first PC of unemployment (given in 
the text), (c) the first PC of investment, (d) average unemployment across the OECD 
sample (e) the first and second PCs of unemployment. 
Table A4a: Two Way Fixed Effects Model 
Dependent variable Δuit , 
N = 21, T =1963 − 2002 
FE MLL=-814.79 
coefficient t-ratio 
uit−1 -0.10 8.21 
Δuit−1 0.44 13.64 
Δpit−1 0.01 1.45 
Table A4b: First Unemployment Factor 
Dependent variable Δuit , N = 21, T =1963 − 2002 : FE MLL=-817.80 
RCM FE 
coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Δft 0.59 8.8 0.62 13.3 
ft−1 0.12 4.0 0.07 7.0 
Δft−1 -0.23 6.0 -0.27 5.8 
uit−1 -0.18 5.8 -0.10 9.0 
Δuit−1 0.38 8.0 0.44 9.1 
Δpit−1 0.82 2.7 0.69 1.6 
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Table A4c: First PC of Investment 
Dependent variable Δuit , N = 21, T =1963 − 2002 ; FE MLL=-862.30 
RCM FE 
coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Δft -0.24 6.97 -0.26 7.90 
ft−1 -0.11 3.87 -0.06 0.94 
Δft−1 0.03 0.71 -0.00 0.05 
uit−1 -0.17 5.78 -0.11 7.31 
Δuit−1 0.39 7.54 0.45 10.01   
Δpit−1 0.67 3.33 0.01 0.38 
Table A4d: Mean Unemployment 
Dependent variable Δuit , N = 21, T =1963 − 2002 ; FE MLL=-815.16 
RCM FE 
coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Δut .95 8.15 0.98 9.14 
ut −1 .20 3.82 0.10 0.40 
Δut −1 -.38   5.88 -0.45 -3.70 
uit−1 -.18 5.51 -0.10 -4.65 
Δuit−1 .37 8.20 0.44 2.00 
Δpit−1 -.13 -1.08 0.01 0.05 
Table A4e: First Two PCs of Unemployment, 1 tf  and 
2 
tf 
Dependent variable Δuit , 21, N = 1963 2002T = − ; FE MLL=-817.65 
RCM FE 
coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
1 
tΔf 0.58 8.48 0.61 2.97 
1 
1tf − 0.19 4.58 0.07 0.43 
1 
1tf −Δ -0.24 3.41 -0.26 0.63 
2 
tΔf -0.06 0.42 -0.03 0.41 
2 
1tf − -0.05 0.72 -0.00 0.00 
2 
1tf −Δ -0.03 0.35 0.02 0.43 
uit−1 -0.29 6.23 -0.10 0.40 
uit−1Δ 0.41 6.70 0.44 1.58 
pit−1Δ 0.78 0.44 0.01 0.47 
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Appendix A5: Institutions and Unemployment Adjustment –  
Table 4: Unrestricted Model 
The estimates in Table 4 are of a restricted version of a model allowing institutions to 
influence all the coefficients. The unrestricted version is shown below, which has a 
MLL of -714.3 with 27 parameters. The restricted model in Table 4 has a MLL of -727 
with 12 parameters, so the restrictions are jointly accepted. Unemployment is measured 
as a deviation from the country mean to allow for fixed effects. 
~Δuit = [a0 + a1coord + a2emp + a3den + a4 rr + a5 dur]
+ [d0 + d1coord + d 2emp + d3den + d 4 rr + d5 dur]
~*[(b0 + b1coord + b2emp + b3den + b4 rr + b5 dur ) f t−1 − ui ,t −1 ]
+ [c0 + c1coord + c2emp + c3den + c4 rr + c5 dur]* Δf t 
+ e1Δf t−1 + e2 Δu ~ i ,t −1 + e3 Δpi ,t−1 + ε it 
Dependent variable Δu%it , N =19, T =1963 − 2002 , obs. = 760 
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
a0 1.15 -0.13 d0  0.46 6.20 
a1 -0.01 0.12 d1 -0.07 3.18 
a2  0.06 0.90 d2 -0.07 2.34 
a3 -0.002 1.41 d3 -0.00 0.01 
a4 -0.11 0.79 d4 -0.11 1.48 
a5  0.03 0.39 d5 -0.09 2.06 
b0 -0.25 1.48 e1 -0.26 5.08 
b1 -0.05 0.59 e2  0.38 7.19 
b2  0.38 4.31 e3  0.03 3.95 
b3  0.01 1.79 
b4  0.85 3.35 
b5  0.43 3.76 
c0  0.51 2.89 
c1  0.03 0.33 
c2 -0.29 2.81 
c3  0.002 1.09 
c4  0.63 3.45 
c5  0.08 0.66 
R 2 = 0.54 , SER = 0.62 MLL = -714. 
It is noticeable that coefficients, b4 and b5 and d4 and d5 that are significant in the 
unrestricted model become insignificant during the sequential search and are not 
included in the restricted model. The individual significance seems to be the result of a 
high correlation between the variables causing cancelling out, so if one is dropped the 
other loses significance. When they are introduced individually in the final model they 
are not significant. 
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Appendix A6: Phillips Curve with Labour Market Institutions (LMI) 
The Phillips Curve in the text was estimated allowing LMI variables to influence the 
parameters, using deviations from the mean for inflation to allow for fixed effects as 
with unemployment. The equation was:  
Δ2 p% = [a + a coord + a emp + a den + a rr + a dur ]it 0 1 2 3 4 5 
+ [d + d coord + d emp + d den + d rr + d dur ]0 1 2 3 4 5 
*⎡u − b + b coord + b emp + b den + b rr + b dur f ⎤⎣ it ( 0 1 2 3 4 5 ) t ⎦
e p e p% e p +ε+ Δ + Δ + Δ1 t 2 i t  , −1 3 t−1 it  
Dependent variable Δ2 pit , N =19, T =1963 − 2002 , obs. = 760 
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
a0 -1.56 2.61 d0 -0.12 1.78 
a1 0.14 0.61 d1 -0.03 1.13 
a2 -0.56 1.86 d2 0.08 2.19 
a3 0.00 0.08 d3 0.00 1.34 
a4 -0.20 0.31 d4 0.02 0.36 
a5 -0.27 0.80 d5 0.02 0.54 
b0 0.10 0.10 e1 0.65 8.75 
b1 1.58 1.94 e2 -0.46 7.88 
b2 -2.51 2.00 e3 0.38 6.44 
b3 -0.05 1.33 
b4 -0.73 0.23 
b5 0.79 0.83 
R 2 = 0.36 , SER = 1.98, MLL =.-1598 
The institutional effects do not seem significant. 
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Appendix A7: Phillips Curves by Country 
Dependent variable change in inflation 
Coefficients in bold if t ratio>2 
uit tf 
2 
tΔ p it 1 tp p−Δ − Δ pit−1Δ int  SER R2 
1 Australia -0.81 0.63 0.86 -0.50 0.07 3.77 1.51 0.54 
(1.96) (1.96) (4.54) (3.29) (0.70) (1.93) 
2 Austria -0.41 0.06 0.29 -0.13 -0.45 2.54 1.09 0.38 
(0.79) (0.30) (2.02) (1.09) (3.22) (1.16) 
3 Belgium -0.38 0.31 0.74 -0.34 -0.08 1.75 0.90 0.70 
(2.39) (2.19) (6.57) (3.28) (1.30) (2.30) 
4 Canada -0.97 0.49 0.01 -1.34 -0.14 5.42 2.15 0.79 
(2.09) (1.71) (0.05) (7.74) (1.02) (1.84) 
5 Denmark 0.02 -0.28 0.71 -0.45 -0.31 1.46 1.45 0.53 
(0.05) (1.23) (3.91) (3.05) (2.59) (1.53) 
6 Finland -0.01 -0.21 0.73 -0.60 -0.11 0.35 1.85 0.52 
(0.05) (1.30) (3.19) (3.52) (1.22) (0.29) 
7 France -0.09 0.05 0.79 -0.49 -0.05 0.19 0.97 0.64 
(0.38) (0.21) (6.11) (3.46) (1.14) (0.11) 
8 Germany -0.32 0.22 0.43 -0.01 -0.29 2.12 0.79 0.53 
(2.29) (1.97) (4.30) (0.25) (3.55) (2.76) 
9 Greece -0.24 0.72 1.50 -0.81 0.26 1.91 3.31 0.42 
(0.49) (1.87) (3.49) (2.27) (0.95) (0.42) 
10 Iceland -3.89 1.48 5.94 -2.62 1.73 6.47 11.47 0.66 
(1.53) (1.95) (4.01) (3.36) (2.52) (0.81) 
11 Ireland -0.41 0.22 0.91 -1.05 0.30 2.27 1.73 0.59 
(3.48) (1.70) (4.22) (4.52) (2.78) (2.45) 
12 Italy -0.31 0.35 1.13 -0.99 0.22 1.47 1.70 0.57 
(0.97) (1.34) (5.03) (4.33) (2.09) (0.55) 
13 Japan -0.69 -0.12 0.93 -0.18 -0.35 2.56 1.83 0.53 
(1.83) (0.95) (4.12) (1.61) (3.38) (2.09) 
14 Netherlands -0.43 0.10 0.44 -0.30 -0.28 2.30 1.26 0.49 
(2.33) (0.82) (2.84) (2.64) (2.87) (3.45) 
15 New Zealand -0.79 0.56 0.54 -0.62 -0.02 3.13 2.26 0.48 
(2.79) (2.28) (1.92) (3.41) (0.21) (2.12) 
16 Norway -0.80 0.14 0.39 -0.60 -0.37 3.60 1.59 0.58 
(2.39) (1.11) (2.02) (4.79) (3.86) (2.83) 
17 Portugal 0.20 0.12 0.52 -1.46 0.64 -1.88 3.48 0.49 
(0.47) (0.56) (1.17) (4.67) (3.07) (0.94) 
18 Spain -0.35 0.39 0.40 -0.61 0.08 3.51 1.96 0.39 
(1.59) (1.09) (1.61) (3.51) (0.84) (1.69) 
19 Sweden -0.44 0.17 0.66 -0.54 -0.24 2.30 1.53 0.60 
(2.16) (1.52) (3.47) (3.97) (2.68) (2.13) 
20 UK -0.84 0.64 1.19 -0.91 0.25 3.04 1.86 0.65 
(2.82) (2.55) (5.10) (4.15) (2.13) (2.36) 
21 US -0.91 0.18 0.87 -0.54 0.06 4.02 1.01 0.73 
(4.16) (2.82) (6.69) (4.95) (0.64) (4.54) 
Mean -0.61 0.3 0.95 -0.72 0.04 2.49 
 Sum MLL -1529.29 
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Appendix A8: Identified Systems Estimates for Change in Unemployment 
and Change in Inflation Equations 
d a b c e1 e2 e3 
1 Australia 0.61 4.81 0.74 0.96 -0.28 0.31 0.07 
(4.55) (14.14) (12.88) (7.00) (1.44) (2.20) (2.20) 
2 Austria * 
3 Belgium 0.17 4.37 0.86 0.58 -0.17 0.45 0.07 
(2.64) (5.93) (8.91) (4.91) (0.72) (2.62) (1.31) 
4 Canada 0.24 5.98 0.52 0.95 -0.22 0.04 0.06 
(1.61) (6.83) (4.09) (5.08) (0.92) (0.21) (1.83) 
5 Denmark * 
6 Finland * 
7 France 0.44 6.49 1.01 0.51 -0.27 0.17 0.03 
(3.33) (13.65) (18.94) (3.10) (1.19) (0.73) (0.90) 
8 Germany 0.01 6.28 0.65 0.61 -0.25 0.47 0.01 
(0.10) (5.16) (6.24) (5.37) (1.61) (2.77) (0.27) 
9 Greece 0.15 8.50 1.09 0.62 -0.31 0.51 -0.04 
(2.12) (6.85) (3.21) (2.92) (1.29) (2.62) (1.98) 
10 Iceland 0.31 2.48 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.20 -0.01 
(2.54) (6.50) (2.22) (1.01) (0.76) (0.80) (1.90) 
11 Ireland 0.08 5.53 0.56 1.28 -0.02 -0.07 0.03 
(1.37) (2.82) (2.42) (3.60) (0.06) (0.44) (0.77) 
12 Italy 0.37 7.51 0.78 0.12 -0.09 0.27 -0.01 
(3.22) (16.09) (12.35) (0.42) (0.33) (0.81) (0.30) 
13 Japan (0.06 3.22 -0.31 0.08 -0.05 0.35 0.03 
(0.84) (2.12) (0.54) (1.12) (0.69) (1.92) (1.41) 
14 Netherlands 0.13 4.60 0.35 0.73 -0.17 0.61 -0.02 
(2.52) (4.68) (1.78) (5.81) (0.78) (4.50) (0.54) 
15 New Zealand 0.17 3.05 0.77 0.57 -0.63 0.48 0.02 
(1.38) (2.67) (4.16) (2.43) (3.40) (2.93) (0.87) 
16 Norway 0.32 3.55 0.29 0.48 -0.31 0.64 -0.04 
(1.61) (6.64) (3.27) (2.58) (1.84 (3.67) (0.80) 
17 Portugal 0.31 4.12 0.25 0.18 0.20 0.56 0.04 
(1.96) (4.13) (1.16) (0.60) (0.67 (1.60) (0.92) 
18 Spain 0.32 8.77 1.49 0.62 -0.17 0.59 0.01 
(2.28) (10.10) (13.70) (3.87) (0.83) (5.59) (0.28) 
19 Sweden 0.15 5.10 0.43 0.73 -0.20 0.41 -0.06 
(1.86) (5.34) (3.26) (5.55) (0.89) (2.50) (1.95) 
20 UK 0.20 3.60 0.78 0.71 -0.38 0.49 0.06 
(3.26) (3.76) (5.25) (3.77) (1.81) (3.13) (2.37) 
21 US 0.36 4.20 0.18 0.75 -0.38 0.08 0.13 
(3.36) (11.51) (3.04) (2.84) (1.79) (0.45) (3.53) 
* Natural rate parameters not identified. 
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Appendix A8 continued 
β γ δ η R2 Δuit R2 2Δ pit 
1 Australia -1.15 0.78 -0.49 0.09 0.75 0.53 
(1.70) (5.22) (2.92) (0.90) 
2 Austria* 
3 Belgium -0.37 0.75 -0.34 -0.07 0.77 0.7 
(1.75) (8.84) (3.01) (0.99) 
4 Canada -1.37 0.00 -1.37 -0.09 0.69 0.78 
(1.46) (0.00) (7.33) (0.39) 
5 Denmark* 
6 Finland* 
7 France -0.14 0.81 -0.37 -0.08 0.74 0.60 
(0.46) (11.81) (3.56) (2.73) 
8 Germany -0.38 0.43 -0.02 -0.31 0.68 0.52 
(2.02) (3.63) (0.42) (2.56) 
9 Greece -0.69 1.27 -0.46 0.01 0.65 0.39 
(1.74) (3.53) (1.27) (0.05) 
10 Iceland -4.60 5.19 -2.19 1.29 0.43 0.65 
(0.85) (4.86) (1.82) (1.38) 
11 Ireland -0.47 0.91 -1.13 0.34 0.48 0.59 
(2.75) (3.38) (3.56) (2.43) 
12 Italy -0.32 0.95 -0.75 0.09 0.66 0.54 
(0.65) (4.15) (3.33) (1.07) 
13 Japan -0.56 0.94 -0.25 -0.30 0.38 0.52 
(0.85) (5.87) (2.59) (4.22) 
14 Netherlands -0.46 0.49 -0.33 -0.23 0.76 0.48 
(1.86) (2.39) (3.64) (2.98) 
15 New Zealand -0.56 0.55 -0.64 0.05 0.51 0.47 
(1.32) (1.90) (4.02) (0.53) 
16 Norway -0.91 0.52 -0.65 -0.28 0.57 0.55 
(1.74) (1.58) (3.15) (2.48) 
17 Portugal 0.21 0.30 -1.23 0.47 0.66 0.47 
(0.49) (0.87) (3.54) (3.22) 
18 Spain -0.37 0.55 -0.64 0.12 0.83 0.36 
(1.45) (1.23) (2.49) (1.20) 
19 Sweden -0.54 0.69 -0.62 -0.27 0.65 0.57 
(2.81) (3.16) (4.87) (2.87) 
20 UK -0.94 1.20 -0.93 0.28 0.73 0.65 
(3.33) (3.44) (3.81) (3.11) 
21 US -1.03 0.84 -0.58 0.12 0.71 0.72 
(4.42) (4.46) (4.82) (1.36) 
* Natural rate parameters not identified. 
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